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中国企业管理层隐性激励机制研究

出版社: 中国言实出版社

出版日期: 2007年8月

作  者: 孟令国;

机构地区: 广东财经大学

摘  要: 在不完全契约条件下,代理人并不会仅仅按照显性契约条款约定的报酬标准确定自己的努力程度,契约中的隐性条款也会成为重要的激励因素。管理层拥有的权力、地位和声誉等因素对管理者的激励作用甚至会远远大于工资、福利等物质因素。经理人市场是隐性激励因素发挥作用的平台,在经理人市场的约束作用下,企业管理层作为代理人需要维护并不断提高个人的声誉值,以获得持续被雇佣的机会和更高的报酬。但是在中国转轨时期,国有企业的经理人面临着更多的不确定的因素,如未来的产权结构及公司治理结构走势如何,在很大程度上还是未知数,经理人声誉的未来收益有很高的折现率,这使企业管理层更加关注当前的利益,从而导致更多的机会主义为。中国既没有建立起保证企业经营者具有长远预期的制度,也没有一个使隐性激励机制发挥作用的完善的经理人市场,这大大弱化了对企业管理层的激励效应。中国当前的市场竞争程度比较低,法制机制还不健全,内部治理结构也不完善,这些都是导致国有企业经营者道德风险问题的重要原因,在此环境下,隐性激励机制的有效性也很难发挥。解决中国转轨时期企业运作过程中的一系列问题的关键是要健全国有企业法人治理结构,培育中国经理人市场,完善企业内部管理层激励体系,强化各种外在的监督和约束制度,使各种管理要素之间能够良性互动,最终实现中国经济体制的平稳转轨。 In the terms of the incomplete contract, agents determines the extent to which they make their efforts not merely by the pay prescribed in the open clauses in the contract, the hidden clauses can also become the significant element of motivation. Intangible factors such as power, status and fame of the management provide much greater impetus to managers than some materials factors like wage and welfare. Markets for the managers offer a platform for the exercise of hidden incentives, under whose control agents acted by the management of the enterprises need to defend and continue to enhance the individual's fame in the hope of more chances to be employed and higher pay. However, in the transitional period, the state-owned enterprises in China are confronted with more unpredictable matters. For instance, the structure of the property right in the future and the tendency of the management of the company in a large degree can't be known definitely. Another example: the managers' fame will bring about more rewards in the future. All these cause the management to be more concerned with present benefits, which results in more speculative operations. In China, there is neither long-term system to the expectations of the runners of the enterprises, nor perfect markets for the managers where the power of the hidden incentives can be displayed, which greatly weakens the effect of motivation on the management of enterprises. Recently, the competition in the Chinese market has been less severe, the mechanism of law and system less perfect, the internal regulating structure not satisfactory. All these are the major reasons for the moral risks for the runners of the state-owned enterprises. Against this background, the hidden incentives are hard to produce powerfiil effect. The key to the problems in the operating process of the enterprises in the transitional period, therefore, lies in the amelioration of the management structure of the owner of the enterprise, cultivation of markets for Chinese managers, perfection of the inc

关 键 词: 国有企业 契约 隐性激励 经理人市场

分 类 号: [F272]

领  域: []

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